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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Draft reply to Corder 15 June

June 4, 1963

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Dear Pat:

I am writing to ask on behalf of our Department whether CIA would be able to undertake a project for which we understand the Agency to be particularly well equipped. We believe it is time for a careful analytical review of the situation in the Himalayan borderlands, and we hope very much that you will see your way to undertaking the project.

Our picture of the scope needed is along these lines. Each segment of the area might be dealt with separately, to include (a) Ladakh, (b) U.P. - Tibet frontier, (c) Nepal, (d) Sikkim, (e) Bhutan, (f) NEFA, and possibly (g) Nagaland.

Among the relevant considerations for each might be these;

## (1) An analysis of vulnerability and strengths:

geographical and topographical characteristics; leadership strengths and limitations; ethnic, religious and other social differences; historic jealousies; the desire for non-Indian alternatives; indigenous capabilities for conventional and counter-insurgency defense; other factors.

## (2) <u>Indian policies and practice</u>:

a summary analysis of Indian policies and practice toward each area, with particular reference to Indian efforts to deal with these vulnerabilities.

## (3) Communist Chinese strategies:

Communist Chinese strategies for dealing with the borderlands, including strategies already visible and those which are plausibly within Chinese capability and intention.

(4) Conclusion:

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Washington.

State Dept. review completed

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(4) Conclusion:

identification of the most important vulnerabilities and an estimate of Indian capacity to deal with them.

were to exchange notes on the elements of items (2) and (3), which deal with Indian and Chinese strategies and policies. We should be very glad to help in any way we could. It might be specially useful if the executors of the project and appropriate INR staff

Perhaps as a first step you would care to designate some representative who knows the field and who could talk with our staff on further elaboration of the details. The project would, I think, be eagerly received and it would be a most creditable product for the Agency.

Sincerely.

Thomas L. Hughes

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